Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2016

Joyce Ravenhill

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2016 – 0303, written 24 Aug 2016. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report24 Aug 2016
Reference2016 – 0303
DeceasedJoyce Ravenhill
CoronerNicholas Rheinberg
Coroner areaCheshire
CategoryCommunity health care and emergency services related deaths
Organisation namedEast Cheshire NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS  

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust 

1 

CORONER 

I am Nicholas Leslie Rheinberg, senior coroner for the coroner area of Cheshire 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 12th January 2016 an investigation into the death of Joyce Mary Ravenhill aged 84 
was commenced. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 23rd August 
2016. The conclusion of the inquest was that the deceased who had died as a result of 
peritonitis, due to intestinal ischaemia, due to arteriosclerosis, had died from Natural 
Causes. 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

The deceased was taken ill during the afternoon of Christmas Day 2015. She had 
enduring abdominal pain and during the night vomited frequently and copiously. At 2.29 
pm on 26th December 2015 the 111 service run by your Trust was contacted and the 
symptoms that the deceased was suffering were relayed to the triage nurse who took 
the call. The triage nurse determined that it was necessary for the deceased to be seen 
by the Out of Hours doctor. However, since the earliest appointment available at that 
time was 5.15 p.m., which was outside the mandated maximum waiting time of two 
hours, the triage nurse indicated that a colleague would telephone back with an earlier 
appointment. Subsequently a second triage nurse did call back but ignorant of the fact 
that the only purpose of her call was to arrange an appointment with the Out of Hours 
doctor, she repeated the triage process and on this occasion determined that the 
deceased did not need to see the Out of Hours doctor. In the event the deceased 
remained unwell and after a further failed attempt on 28th December to secure a doctor’s 
appointment through the 111 system obtained an urgent appointment with a local GP on 
the following day. The GP arranged for the deceased’s admission to Macclesfield 
Hospital where it was discovered that the deceased had an incarcerated femoral hernia 
which had caused an intestinal obstruction. Although a successful operation was carried 
out that day to repair the hernia, the deceased died on 2nd January 2016. It is probable 
that the incarceration of the hernia, together with the intestinal obstruction and the 
sequela of that condition including vomiting and resulting dehydration played a causal 
part in the death. It is possible that earlier recognition of the problem and earlier 
intervention might have prevented the deceased’s death. 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

1

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –  

Although a summary of the first triage assessment on 26th December 2015 was 
available to the second triage nurse, there was no facility / operational policy whereby 
the simple fact that the deceased needed an urgent doctor’s appointment could be 
effectively communicated by the first triage nurse to the second, all information and 
communication being automatically electronically generated. 
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

6 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you and your 
organisation have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 20th October 2016. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
the deceased’s daughter on behalf of the family and the CQC. 
Persons 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary 
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful 
or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your 
response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

9 

Dated       24th August 2016           SIGNED 

                                                        Senior Coroner 

2

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust (PDF)
North West Ambulance Service [ip £3

NHS Trust

run RE po roo
First Floor
YOUR REF: Sefton House

Northgate Close

11" October 2016 Middlerook
Horwich

BL6 6PQ

Mr NL Rheinberg L.L.B L.L.M M.A. Dip Crim (Cantab)

Senior Coroner for Cheshire Wwww.nwas.nhs.uk

West Annexe

Town Hall

Sankey Street

Warrington

WA1 1UH

Dear Mr Rheinberg
Prevention of future death report following inquest into the death of Joyce Mary Ravenhill

| write further to your letter dated 24" August in connection with the inquest into the death of Joyce Mary
Ravenhill.

The incident in question occurred during the Christmas and New Year period 2015/2016. During that period
the NHS 111 service received two calls from the daughter of Mrs Ravenhill, who was visiting her family in
Macclesfield, Cheshire, having travelled from her home in Doncaster.

As a result of the first call, the assessment of the NHS 111 service was that Mrs Ravenhill should have a face
to face consultation with a clinician from the local GP Out of Hours (OOH) service within 2 hours.

The OOH service in Macclesfield is operated by East Cheshire NHS Trust (ECT).

Where the NHS 111 patient assessment arrives at a primary care referral outcome, there are essentially
two types of referral. These are ‘speak to’ and ‘contact’. Each of these types will then have an associated
time frame applied. ‘Speak to’ outcomes require the patient to have a contact call from the relevant
primary care provider, to assess ongoing need. ‘Contact’ outcomes are required to receive a face to face
clinical assessment.

In practice, across the North West, local GP OOH services have various commissioning arrangements in
place, and may choose to manage the NHS 111 referrals differently. Many choose to reassess all patients by
telephone, regardless of the initial NHS 111 recommendation. NWAS manages up to 2 million NHS 111 calls
each year and we are cognisant of the variation of commissioned practice across the region.

The NWAS NHS 111 service and ECT, have an arrangement whereby the NHS 111 service assessment is
accepted to have been sufficiently detailed to be considered a ‘definitive clinical assessment’. ECT accept
that the time frame for the next stage of care suggested by the NHS 111 assessment is correct, and have
allowed the NHS 111 service access to their appointment booking system. The NHS 111 service therefore
completes the patient assessment and if a ‘contact’ outcome is reached, offers the next available
appointment time to the patient. If a ‘speak to’ outcome is reached, the patient is advised accordingly, and
told to expect a call back from ECT.

Headquarters: Ladybridge Hall, 399 Chorley New Road, Bolton. BL1 5DD

a ¢ y NvesToRs Champion EYE Delivering the right care, at the right time, in the right place
Chief Executive: Mr D Cartwright nod ~ AsayP

In both cases, the full electronic record of the assessment is transferred from the NHS 111 service to the
ECT OOH service, in order to inform the next stage of care.

This appointment booking arrangement is unique in the North West; all other OOH services have so far
chosen not to offer NHS 111 booked appointments, though this position is expected to change with
learning from experience in Eastern Cheshire.

Where a ‘contact’ appointment has not been available for booking, the agreed process is that the patient
record should be sent electronically, and that the receiving staff at ECT should recognise from the call
outcome summary that this is a ‘contact’ request and make arrangements to call the patient back and
provide an appointment time. ECT has an ability to hold back a small number of appointments for this
eventuality.

In this situation, the ECT referral system would receive the transferred information, and present the
‘contact’ referral alongside ‘speak to’ referrals for their action.

This arrangement has been in place for some time, and operated without incident, however the root cause
analysis into Mrs Ravenhill’s death identified that the actions of the ECT staff may have been affected as a
result of not realising that this was a ‘contact’ request. The ECT clinician instead carried out a reassessment
of the patient, and determined that a face to face assessment was not indicated.

In the inquest the you remarked that this inability to clearly see that the call was a ‘contact’ call rather than
a ‘speak to’ call led the ECT clinician to perform this reassessment rather than simply offering a face to face
appointment. Whilst NWAS would contend that the information was in fact available, we accept that
further steps needed be taken to make the information clearer.

Actions taken

Following the initial request for information in support of the Inquest, NWAS carried out an assessment of
our involvement in Mrs Ravenhill’s care. In addition to the matter noted above, some further issues in the
call were identified on the part of one of our clinicians in the NHS 111 service. NWAS reported the incident
under its StEIS reporting procedure and carried out a full investigation.

A further full joint root cause analysis exercise was undertaken between NWAS and ECT.

Where the findings of both incidents related to individual staff failings in the NHS 111 service, these have
been addressed through reflection and retraining, with staff removed from duty until the retraining and
review were satisfactorily completed.

A clinical issue relating to the management of abdominal pain and vomiting blood was subsequently
identified through the investigation into a different, unrelated incident. That issue was found to be
common to this investigation and as a result has been reported to the national NHS Pathways authoring
team. The NHS Pathways team has recognised the issues that we identified, and have agreed to review this
assessment pathway, specifically the question and answer algorithms, in order to-remove any potential for
confusion and incorrect use.

Guidance has been issued to NWAS NHS 111 staff in the management of abdominal pain and vomiting, as
an interim measure pending any national NHS Pathways redesign.

In terms of the specific issue raised relating to the visibility of calls where appointments could not be
booked, actions have been taken by both NWAS and ECT in order to ensure that ‘contact’ outcomes
requiring an appointment can be easily identified.

At NWAS a procedure has been applied for all staff to manually note where an appointment booking has
been attempted, but found not to be possible.

Additionally, staff guidance has been issued at ECT to help them to navigate the NHS 111 electronic data
that has been transferred between systems, again to ensure that there is no risk of misinterpretation of the
information exchanged.

At ECT, technical changes have been designed on their IT infrastructure to highlight transferred records
relating to failed appointment bookings. That change has been applied to their system, and fully tested.
From now on, ‘contact’ outcomes with no available appointment will be clear to ECT staff, prompting them
to take the appropriate action, and removing the risk identified at Inquest.

| hope that the content of this letter offers assurance that the matters associated with this tragic incident
have been investigated, with lessons learned and actions taken to help to prevent a recurrence of not only
this specific sequence of events, but from a wider perspective the way that all abdominal pain and vomiting
is managed by the NHS 111 service and NHS Pathways.

If you have any further concerns or questions related to this incident, please do not hesitate to contact me

Yours sincerely

Regional Manager — North West NHS 111 Service Operations

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